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JUDICIAL INTERPRETIVE FINALITY AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 
John Harrison* 
Elephants leave traces when they pass by.' That is true 
about the Constitution as it is elsewhere. For example, once the 
Federal Convention had made the basic decision to propose a 
national government of three independent branches, it imple-
mented that decision unmistakably. Much of the Constitution is 
concerned with the selection, tenure, and powers of the sepa-
rated legislature, executive, and judiciary. One way to tell 
whether the Constitution adopts a principle is thus to look for its 
traces, and one way to do that is to ask: If the framers had 
planned to include the principle, or had assumed that other deci-
sions they had made entailed the principle, where would it mani-
fest itself? 
The principle of Cooper v. Aaron/ according to which the 
Supreme Court's opinion in a case binds all other legal actors, 
whether parties or not, is a good-sized elephant. That fact sug-
gests one way to determine whether it is a sound interpretation: 
Ask how the framers would have worked it into their system, 
and what they would have had to do in order to resolve the fun-
damental questions that came with including or assuming it. That 
question can be answered by taking guidance from similar prin-
ciples that are clearly manifested, seeing how those manifesta-
tions work and in particular how the Constitution deals with the 
issues that must be resolved if the principle is present. 
A careful examination of the text contradicts the hypothesis 
that the drafters meant to include, or assumed that their other 
* D. Lurton Masscc Professor of Law, University of Virginia. Helpful comments 
on earlier versions were provided by Larry Alexander, Fred Schauer, Bill Stuntz, and 
Ted White. 
I. "If there was an elephant in the snow, he's going to leave some tracks." BILL 
JAMES, THE BILL JAMES BASEBALL ABSTRACf 1983, 173 (1983). 
2. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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decisions entailed, the Cooper principle of judicial interpretive 
finality. 3 The elephant left no traces. 
This focus on the particular supplies the answer to a natural 
question: What is the justification for one more article on judi-
cial supremacy? The answer is that so far the debate on this sub-
ject has mainly focused on large principles rather than particular 
text and the absence thereof. Cooper itself relies on the fairly ab-
stract principle that the courts have a special function when it 
comes to interpreting the law.4 Two important defenders of 
Cooper, Schauer and Alexander, rely on the even more abstract 
principle that the rule of law is justified by the coordination 
function law plays.5 A prominent critic, Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
relies on the principle that the branches of government are inde-
pendent of one another, another high-level concept.6 In an im-
portant recent contribution, Edward Hartnett argues against ju-
dicial finality by pointing to a range of practices that assume that 
the central function of courts is to resolve concrete disputes, not 
to decide abstract propositions of law.7 
Indeed, to some extent the debate as it has proceeded so far 
makes my point. That debate has not been about particular pro-
visions because there are no provisions for it to be about. In one 
place after another, where Cooper suggests that the Constitution 
should say something, it is silent. 
3. Although I refer to the Federal Convention, my argument centers on the text of 
the Constitution and its surrounding historical circumstances and does not rely on any 
information idiosyncratic to the specific individuals who framed or ratified the Constitu-
tion. The analysis here thus should be of interest both to textualists who reject inquiry 
into individuals' intentions and to intentionalists who believe that interpretation properly 
begins with the document itself. 
4. The opinion cites Article VI and invokes Marbury v. Madison. 
[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in 
the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since 
been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable 
feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the su-
preme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding ef-
fect on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding." 
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. The opinion then relies on the Article VI oath. !d. 
5. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter-
pretacion, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). 
6. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say 
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217,228,322 (1994). 
7. Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 123 (1999). 
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Most fundamental of all is the absence of any equivalent to 
Article VI for judicial opinions.8 The supremacy of federal law, 
and the oath-bound duty of state officers to recognize it, binds 
together the legal hierarchy established by the Constitution. Ju-
dicial interpretive finality attributes a functionally similar su-
premacy to judicial opinions, making them conclusive gloss on 
the law they interpret, including especially the law that is itself 
made supreme by Article VI. According to the judicial finality 
thesis, then, opinions have a very important place in the legal hi-
erarchy, the creation of which was absolutely fundamental to the 
Constitution. While two centuries of experience may have dulled 
awareness of the radical nature of Article VI, it remains a re-
markable measure, reaching into otherwise independent sover-
eignties and changing their rules on the most basic question of 
all. Moreover, the language of Article VI shows that the Federal 
Convention paid close attention to the precise contours of the 
supremacy rule it drafted; pre-existing treaties trump state law, 
but other actions of the United States under the Articles of Con-
federation do not.9 Yet the Constitution does not give judicial 
opinions the interpretive supremacy that it gives to substantive 
federal law. Had the drafters meant to introduce this principle, 
thereby imposing judicial finality on the existing state constitu-
tions, it is likely that opinions would have been dealt with explic-
itly.Io 
It is also likely that drafters planning on such a basic role for 
judicial opinions would have said something about when and 
how they are to be produced. Each of the authoritative texts on 
the Article VI list is generated by a process set out in the Consti-
tution itself. Article VII governs that document's adoption, and 
Article V its amendment, while Article I, Section 7 controls the 
8. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2. Paragraph 3 requires that Senators, 
Representatives, members of state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of 
the United States and the States be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Consti-
tution. 
9. /d. 
10. It is not clear whether the framers would have included opinions on the Article 
VI list itself or would have provided for them elsewhere. As discussed below, American 
courts are not limited to construing the kinds of law listed in the Supremacy Clause, and 
the question of interpretive finality with respect to a kind of law is conceptually distinct 
from that of the status of that law in a legal hierarchy. The point is that conclusive gloss 
has a function in the system very similar to that of supreme substantive law and that the 
framers evidently thought that the function of the latter was central to their scheme. 
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production of federal laws and Article II, Section 2 does the 
~arne for treaties. Again, no mention is made of judicial opin-
Ions. 
And again experience may let us lose sight of how odd that 
would be, were opinions as important as Cooper says they are. 
Consider the main focus of attention in this context: the Su-
preme Court of the United States. For decades the Court has fol-
lowed a practice that may seem inevitable because of its familiar-
ity but that is in fact only one way of doing things. According to 
that practice, a fully binding opinion of the Court is generated 
when a majority of the participating Justices votes in favor of it, 
thereby signifying that it speaks for them. History shows that 
there are other possibilities. Before John Marshall it was cus-
tomary for opinions to be delivered seriatim, with each Justice 
who had something to say speaking for himself alone.'' Hold-
ings, and thus precedent, were distilled from those opinions, no 
one of which was uniquely authoritative. Under John Marshall 
the practice looked like the one we know but apparently was 
sometimes quite different. According to the leading scholar of 
the Marshall Court's inner workings, it was common for so-
called opinions of the Court to reflect only the views of the au-
thor (usually the Chief Justice in constitutional cases), not even 
having been circulated to the other members of the majority. 12 
They would have agreed on the outcome and perhaps on the 
broad rationale, but would not have reviewed the language be-
fore it was read from the bench. 
If Cooper-style absolute authority is generated only when a 
majority of the Justices subscribes to an opinion as such, then it 
is entirely possible that Marbury and McCulloch 13 lack such au-
thority. Chief Justice Marshall may not have run them by his col-
leagues in final form the way we can assume that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist ran Seminole Tribe 14 by his. As this observation illus-
trates, the details of the opinion-generating process are quite 
important, just as the details of the presidential veto are quite 
II. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419 (1793). 
12. In the Marshall Court, "opinions delivered by one Justice in court had not been 
subscribed to, in all their language, by the other Justices, not even the ones joining in the 
opinion." G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-
1835, 182 (1988). As White notes, this differs substantially from modem practice. "To 
imagine a comparable situation in a modern Supreme Court-the Chief Justice writing 
lengthy per curiam opinions on major cases that, although subscribed to by the Associate 
Justices, had not even been read by the subscribers-boggles the mind." ld. at 192. 
13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
14. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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important. Yet if the conclusive gloss thesis is correct, drafters 
who went to the trouble of excepting Sundays from the Presi-
dent's ten-day review period for bills did not think it necessary 
to sax anything about how to make a binding judicial interpreta-
tion. 5 
If they simply assumed that there was such a rule built into 
Article III, that assumption has been lost without a trace; the ab-
sence of a trace suggests that it was not there in the first place. 
More plausible is the response that the Constitution does deal 
with this problem, the same way it deals with other problems 
concerning judicial procedure: Congress has authority to pass 
laws that are necessary and proper to carry out the judicial 
power, and the rules governing the production of opinions are 
certainly that. Indeed, Congress has legislated on this general 
subject from the very beginning. The Judiciary Act of 1789 cre-
ated a six-judge Supreme Court and made four a quorum. 16 To-
day six of nine is a quorum under 28 U.S.C. § 1. All authoritative 
acts of the Court take place according to the quorum rule. Con-
gress thus has clearly legislated concerning the production of 
judgments; why could it not legislate concerning the production 
of authoritative opinions? 
While this latter argument is more plausible than the pure 
appeal to unstated assumptions, it has serious difficulties. An ab-
solutely authoritative opinion is much more powerful than a 
judgment because the opinion operates with the generality and 
prospectivity of a statute. A close examination of Article I sug-
gests that the Constitution draws a line that is relevant here. 
House and Senate both have power to adopt their own rules of 
procedure, yet that power does not extend to all aspects of the 
most fundamental procedure of all, the procedure by which a 
statute is adopted. 1 On that score the essentials are set out in 
the Constitution itself and not left to either House. It is one 
thing to decide how many committees to have and how much 
debate to permit; it is another thing to decide whether the Presi-
dent is involved in the legislative process. A similar approach to 
authoritative judicial opinions would have the most important 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7 (designating the time for the President to sign or veto a 
bill as ten days "(Sundays excepted)"). 
16. 1 Stat. 73 § 1 (1789). 
17. Under Article I, Section 5, para. 2, each house of Congress has power to deter-
mine its rules of proceedings. In addition to that general power, the Constitution itself 
sets out procedural rules for fundamental or important matters, such as the quorum rule, 
cd. § 5, para. 1, and the method of passing laws, id. § 7. 
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questions about how to produce them answered by the Constitu-
tion itself, but they are not. 
So far I have emphasized the functional similarity between 
authoritative judicial opinions and the sources of supreme fed-
eral law listed in Article VI. One response to my argument is 
that judicial opinions need not be mentioned because they are a 
side effect of a process that is dealt with in detail in Article III, 
the process of deciding cases. Article III is indeed the right place 
to look, for that is the place in which a drafter who wished to 
provide for judicial finality, or who believed that it followed 
naturally from providing for a judiciary, would have dealt with it. 
Yet while the judiciary article does provide the fundamental 
rules about deciding cases, it addresses none of the issues that 
arise if one believes that in the retail process of deciding cases 
courts are also producing legal interpretations that are good 
wholesale. 
The Constitution creates a complicated judicial system to 
administer the complicated legal hierarchy that it establishes. 
Article III provides for one Supreme Court and authorizes Con-
gress to create inferior federal courts. Article VI contemplates 
that there will be state courts, singling out their judges as obli-
gees of the constitutional oath and federal supremacy. While the 
system is complex, the Constitution's rules about jurisdiction, 
which is to say for the resolution of particular cases, are explicit 
and quite adequate. Article III sets out the maximum range of 
federal court jurisdiction and sets out the default rule from 
which Congress may vary. Under the default, there are no infe-
rior federal courts and the Supreme Court has all the Article III 
jurisdiction. A little of that jurisdiction is original and the rest 
appellate, implying that in the default configuration the Court 
has appellate jurisdiction over state courts with respect to all the 
cases on the menu, except those with respect to which it has 
original juris diction. Congress may depart from this structure by 
creating inferior federal courts with authority to decide some of 
the Article III cases and by making exceptions to the appeals the 
Court may entertain. 
While Article III is thus all about the allocation of the case-
deciding power among the courts, it says nothing about the allo-
cation of the Cooper power among them; yet once again, if there 
is such a power, it raises many questions. Do the inferior federal 
courts have a share of it, and if so how does that work? It is rea-
sonable to think that they must have some version of that power, 
for they are vested with the same judicial power of the United 
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States that the Supreme Court has. 18 But their complicated struc-
ture introduces knotty problems. Suppose for example that the 
Third Circuit has decided an issue of federal law that affects an 
individual who resides in Pennsylvania but does business in 
Maryland and so is subject to suit in a federal district court in ei-
ther State. Perhaps the individual is absolutely bound by the 
Third Circuit's doctrine, because the issue could come before 
that court, but perhaps not, because the issue could come up in 
another court. Matters are more troublesome for such an indi-
vidual if the Third and Fourth Circuits have an unresolved con-
flict on the point. 
Then there is the question of the Cooper authority of fed-
eral district court decisions. For reasons that have never been 
clear, the district courts do not consider themselves preceden-
tially bound even by their own prior decisions, let alone those of 
other district courts. 19 That suggests that what they say cannot be 
absolutely authoritative, yet they too are vested with judicial 
power. 
Not only does the federal system have a complicated inter-
nal structure, it must share the country with the state courts, 
which also must construe and apply federal law. Thus the ques-
tions concerning overlapping jurisdictions arise with even 
greater force. What is true as between the Third and Fourth Cir-
cuits is true between the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court 
of Virginia: People undertake activity that could give rise to liti-
gation in either one without knowing, at the time, where the liti-
gation will take place. 
In addition to that problem, the state courts create a more 
subtle and probably more difficult question: Do they have any of 
the Cooper power? It is natural to answer that this is a question 
of state law, just as their jurisdiction is a question of state law. 
Yet Article VI recruits the state courts to enforce federal su-
premacy. Within their jurisdiction, they perform an important 
federal function even though they remain state courts. Indeed, as 
history demonstrates they can have the last word on constitu-
18. Some judges of the inferior federal courts believe that opinions of the courts of 
appeals have Cooper-like status. See, e.g., Hutchison for Hutchison v. Chater, 99 F.3d 
286, 287 (8th Cir. 1996) (Wollman, J.) ("Regardless of whether the Commissioner [of 
Social Security] formally announces her acquiescence, however, she is still bound by the 
law of this Circuit and does not have the discretion to decide whether to adhere to it."). 
The issue is discussed at length in Samuel Estreicher and Richard L. Revesz, Nonacqui-
escence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679,passim (1989). 
19. E.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, 1fi0 F. 3d 358, 359 (7th Cir. 1998) ("(A] dis-
trict court's decision does not have precedential authority."). 
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tional questions. From 1789 to 1914 the Supreme Court of the 
United States had no jurisdiction to review a state court decision 
that held a state law invalid because it conflicted with federal 
law.20 In such cases the state courts were final. It is a plausible 
theory of judicial interpretive finality that the interpretations 
they reached in such cases should have been absolutely authori-
tative as a matter of federal law. If the point of conclusive gloss 
is to turn retail judicial decisions into wholesale decisions, and 
the state courts are exclusively performing the function of gen-
erating the gloss, then the Constitution should recruit the state 
courts wholesale as it recruits them retail. 
Once again there is no equivalent to the Supremacy Clause 
that deals with state court opinions rather than their resolution 
of cases. That silence is especially striking because the Constitu-
tion generally is quite specific when it carves out a role for the 
state governments in the system it creates.21 The care the Federal 
Convention took in that regard reflects the issue's delicacy. First, 
the role of the state governments in the system had profound 
implications for the balance of power between national and local 
interests, and striking that balance was the single trickiest prob-
lem the Convention faced. Second, it was especially tricky for 
the new Constitution to reach into the state constitutions, as it 
does in a few carefully selected ways. Any interference with the 
political autonomy of the States was a matter of great delicacy, 
and imposing on them the rule of Cooper would have been a sig-
nificant interference. 
The highly reticulated American judicial system administers 
a complex legal hierarchy; there is more law than just federal law 
that can be given a conclusive construction. The Cooper ele-
phant would have visited the interpretation of state law. Indeed, 
drafters with judicial finality in mind would have realized that 
20. See Edward Hartnett, Why Is the Supreme Court of the United States Protecting 
State Judges from Popular Democracy? 75 TEX. L. REV. 907, 915·922 (describing jurisdic· 
tiona! structure between 1789 and 1914). As Hartnett explains, the Supreme Court's ju· 
risdiction was expanded in 1914largely in response to lves v. South Buffalo Railway, 201 
N.Y. 271 (1911), in which the New York Court of Appeals had held New York's workers' 
compensation statute unconstitutional on state and federal grounds, a decision that could 
not be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States because it held in favor of 
the party claiming under federal law. /d. at 949-56. 
21. The Supremacy Clause, with its reference to state courts, is an example. U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, para. 2. Another is the carefully structured system in which the state mili-
tia are partially integrated into the federal military structure. The President commands 
the militia when they are called into federal service, U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, para. 1, as 
they may be pursuant to an act of Congress in specified situations, id. at para. 15, but 
they remain under officers chosen pursuant to state law, id. at para. 16. 
2006] JUDICIAL INTERPRETIVE FINALITY 41 
state law (and non-federal law more generally) presents an espe-
cially troublesome problem, because the most natural answer is 
not available. That answer, which perhaps could be taken as un-
stated with respect to federal law, is that only the court that can 
finally resolve all cases concerning the body of legal norms at is-
sue can be absolutely authoritative with respect to that body of 
legal norms. But for American state law there is no such court. 
Since the framing the Supreme Court of the United States 
has been the tribunal of last resort in a large class of diversity 
cases that turn wholly on state law. Issues of state law can also 
come up in cases under any of the other heads of Article III ju-
risdiction, as when a plaintiff brings claims under both state and 
federal law in a federal district court. 22 Yet there are and always 
have been many cases involving state law that do not come 
within the Article III jurisdiction. Neither the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania nor the Supreme Court of the United States has a 
monopoly on the interpretation of Pennsylvania law. 
This is a notoriously difficult problem. For many decades 
the federal courts generally regarded themselves as bound by 
state-court precedents concerning state statutes but not by state-
court precedents concerning unwritten law, or at least unwritten 
law that was not peculiarly that of any one State.23 Then in 1938 
the Justices decided that they and their predecessors had been 
committing a grievous error, indeed had been pursuing an un-
constitutional course.24 They should have been regarding them-
selves as absolutely bound by state-court precedents on state 
law, despite their jurisdiction over many cases turning on such 
law. 
Neither before nor after Erie were the courts, state or fed-
eral, relying on any explicit guidance from Article III. The Con-
stitution says nothing about whether the Supreme Court of the 
United States must follow the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or 
22. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 7I5 (I966) (state-
law claims were properly decided by federal district court when pendent to federal claims 
that gave jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 
23. The leading case for the proposition that federal courts were not bound by state 
court interpretations of general, as opposed to peculiarly local, law, was Swift v. Tyson, 
41 U.S. (I6 Pet.) I (1842). A prominent decision in favor of deference to state court in-
terpretation of state statutes was Green v. Neal's Lessee, 3I U.S. (6 Pet.) 29I (1832). The 
Court struggled with the latter principle in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 
175 (I863), acknowledging its "settled rule" of deferring to state courts in the construc-
tion of state statutes, but finding that rule to be relaxed in "exceptional cases," as when 
the state courts themselves had wavered in their views. /d. at 206-07. 
24. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,304 U.S. 64 (I938). 
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vice versa. If its drafters were not thinking about judicial opin-
ions and their effects on non-parties, but rather about judicial 
decisions with respect to parties, this is not surprising. Article III 
does provide the rules that tell who can decide cases; it just lacks 
the rules that tell who can decide issues. If they were assuming 
that at least some courts would be conclusive in their pro-
nouncements, it is a significant omission, as two hundred years of 
varying practice have demonstrated. Indeed, the terminology 
they chose indicates that they were thinking about the resolution 
of cases because it is with respect to cases that the Supreme 
Court of the United States is set up to be supreme, with appel-
late jurisdiction over all other American courts. Under both 
Swift and Erie, however, the Court is not final as to all the issues 
that can come before it; those cases differed as to the scope of 
state-court primacy, not its existence. 
My approach involves looking for traces, but it may seem 
that the elephant is in the middle in the room, or in this case on 
display in the first sentence of Article III. Courts of the United 
States have the judicial power. Maybe that automatically brings 
with it the power to generate interpretations of the law that bind 
all other actors, and in particular all other branches of govern-
ment. If the courts' judgments have that binding effect, their ex-
planations do too. 
In assessing this claim it is important to contrast it with one 
with which it is easily confused. Whatever else it entails, judicial 
power brings with it the authority to resolve concrete disputes 
with substantial finality. In the process of performing that func-
tion courts must interpret the law. It may be sound policy for the 
institution that produces such interpretation, and is supposed to 
produce it impartially, to be given primacy with respect not only 
to disputes but also abstract principles. On the other hand, it 
may not be; the debate over judicial interpretive finality is in 
large measure a debate on that subject. The point I wish to stress 
is that this argument, although easily confused with a conceptual 
argument about the judicial power, is not one. 
Rather, the conceptual argument is that people generally 
understand that the case-deciding power and the law-glossing 
power are necessarily linked. That argument is much more diffi-
cult to sustain because it is easy to understand the judicial power 
as being limited to the resolution of cases. This is the kind of ju-
dicial power exercised by United States District Courts, whose 
opinions do not even have precedential authority on the court 
that issued them. All the district courts do is decide cases, and 
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they do it with judicial power. Hartnett has demonstrated that 
long-standing practice concerning the operation of courts ac-
cords best with this more limited conception.25 
Courts that are limited to deciding cases were even more 
common in the early days under the Constitution because the 
mechanisms for the production, preservation, and dissemination 
of judicial opinions were primitive by our standards. That fact 
has important implications for a question that naturally arises at 
this point: Did people at the time of the framing believe that ju-
dicial power entailed the authority to bind all other legal actors 
to abstract interpretive conclusions rather than just the outcome 
of particular legal disputes? 
As to the ultimate question of judicial finality, the framers 
seem to have been as divided as Americans are today. 26 Their 
conduct, however, makes it hard to believe that many of them 
believed that the power to decide cases necessarily brought with 
it the power to produce generally binding interpretation because 
they were so haphazard about the opinions in which interpreta-
tion would be found. According to Cooper, judicial opinions 
have a status almost equal to that of the Constitution itself. Yet 
the production and distribution of opinions was a fairly casual 
matter in the early days of the government. The transition from 
oral to written opinions was just beginning. As Surrency ex-
plained, the first state to require written opinions seems to have 
been Connecticut in 1784; Pennsylvania in 1806 required that 
opinions be reduced to writing if requested by counsel but did 
not impose a general mandate for written opinions until1845. 27 
25. Hartnett, supra note 7, at 146-48. 
26. David Engdahl maintains that during the 1790s not only was judicial review 
widely accepted, so that Marbury was not a bolt from the blue, but so was judicial su-
premacy, the principle that judicial decisions concerning constitutional questions are 
binding on other government actors. John Marshall, though, believed in judicial review 
but not judicial supremacy. David Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of 
Judicial Review, 42 DUKE L. J. 279, 279-82 (1992). The evidence Engdahl presents, how-
ever, supports a widespread belief in judicial review much more strongly than it supports 
a similar belief in judicial supremacy. As he notes, the latter position was hardly universal 
among prominent political figures; James Madison and Thomas Jefferson never shared it. 
!d. at 298-99. Moreover, Engdahl explains that one source of confidence in the judiciary 
during the very early constitutional period was the participation of juries in finding the 
law as well as the facts. !d. at 291-94. Juries did not write opinions then any more than 
they do now, and hence it would take a series of adjudications involving juries to estab-
lish a point of constitutional law, as juries kept reaching the same result on varying facts. 
A jury-centered form of judicial supremacy, even if anyone believed in it, is very differ-
ent from the form of judicial supremacy that is the subject of current debate. Cooper v. 
Aaron does not seem to contemplate a decisive role for Arkansas juries. 
27. Erwin C. Surrency, Law Reports in the United States, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 48, 
55 (1981). 
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The Supreme Court of the United States, the principal con-
cern for most proponents of the Cooper principle, did not start 
out with written opinions, but rather adopted that practice after 
a few years. In his first volume of reports Cranch, the Court's 
second unofficial reporter, noted that he had been "relieved 
from much anxiety, as well as responsibility, by the practice 
which the court has adopted of reducing their opinion to writing, 
in all cases of difficulty or importance. "28 Dallas, Cranch's 
predecessor as unofficial reporter, apparently had no such lux-
ury.29 And even in Cranch's time and later, written opinions, 
when produced, were somewhat unofficial; they were not re-
quired to be filed with the Clerk of the Court until1834.30 
Dallas and Cranch themselves were not what one would 
hope for in a reporter of decisions today. Dallas' reports, at least 
when the Justices did not give him written opinions, are of 
doubtful accuracy and were often years late.31 Cranch, as noted, 
had the advantage of getting something in writing from the Jus-
tices, but that did not keep him from being late too.32 No doubt 
both unofficial reporters were responding to limited demand for 
Supreme Court opinions. If those opinions, when available, were 
one form of authority, that limited demand is understandable. If 
they were as powerful as the judicial finality thesis suggests, it is 
quite strange. 
Whatever the view of the bar may have been, neither Con-
gress nor the Justices seems to have been especially concerned 
about their opinions. Joyce reports that there are no known fin-
ished manuscript opinions, written in the hands of the Justices, 
from the Court's first decade.33 Congress also treated the Court's 
opinions as documents of secondary importance. The First Con-
gress, in its first session, provided for the preservation and distri-
bution of its statutes, and in its second session made a similar 
provision for treaties.34 More than a decade and a half later in 
28. 1 Cranch iv-v (1804). 
29. Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspec-
tive on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1298 (1985). 
30. Jd. at 1298, n.46. 
31. "Delay, expense, omission and inaccuracy; these were among the hallmarks of 
Dallas' work." /d. at 1305. 
32. Joyce suggests that Cranch obtained from the Justices, not actual opinions, but 
their written notes from which oral opinions were delivered. Jd. at 1310 n.l10. For 
Cranch's delay, see id. at 1311. 
33. Jd. at 1304. 
34. Congress directed the Secretary of State to keep and publish its statutes in 1789. 
Act of September 15, 1789, ch. xiv, 1 Stat. 68. Treaties were included in that mandate less 
than a year later. Act of June 14, 1790, Resolution II, 1 Stat. 187. 
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1817, Congress authorized an official Reporter of Decisions for 
the Supreme Court.35 And even at that point, as noted above, 
opinions might or might not be for the Court in our sense; there 
was no obligation to prepare written opinions and no obligation 
to make sure that written opinions made their way to the Re-
porter of Decisions. Members of Congress apparently thought 
that the bar and country would profit from having whatever ex-
planations the Justices decided to provide. If they had thought 
that those explanations had a status close to that of the Constitu-
tion itself, it is likely that Congress would have acted much 
sooner and more comprehensively to make sure that such an im-
portant part of the constitutional machinery was in working or-
der.36 
None of this is to suggest that lawyers at the time of the 
framing and in the early national period regarded judicial opin-
ions as irrelevant. Rather, they seem to have regarded opinions, 
when they existed and were accurately reported, as authority of 
considerable importance.37 That status is certainly respectable, 
but it is still a long way from the exalted position to which Coo-
per raises the courts' explanations of what they have done. If the 
framers and their immediate successors thought that so much 
flowed from the courts' possession of judicial power, they did 
not betray that belief through their actions. 
No traces, no elephant. 
35. Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 63, 3 Stat. 37G. 
36. Hartnett reviews much of this history in arguing for the primacy of judgments 
over opinions. Hartnett, supra note 7, at 128-30. 
37. The acceptance, then and now, of the importance of judicial precedent does not 
imply judicial supremacy. Stare decisis is a principle that courts invoke with respect to 
their own cases; its existence does not imply that non-judicial actors are similarly bound. 
That is true even if the practice of respecting precedents is itself constitutionally derived. 
I have argued elsewhere that it is not, and that instead, the rules of precedent in federal 
court are, in contemporary terminology, federal common law. See John Harrison, The 
Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000). 
